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Abstract
In this paper we explore how post-petroleum security is continually shaped by both the micropo-
litical practices of everyday life as well as the changing geopolitics of energy landscapes. We focus 
in particular on the two-decade long struggle over access to hydrocarbon deposits outside the 
Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja archipelago groups (LoVeSe), and show how local security perspec-
tives permeate both national and international debates concerning the future of oil and the global 
climate challenge. These developments, we argue, are taking place in a paradoxical conjunction 
with Norwegian political establishment who along with the oil and gas industry insist on continued 
petroleum dependency as the only viable future. We further investigate how particular controlling 
measures have determined past, present and future narratives, and assess how alternative ideas 
that include multiple possible trajectories have found their way into national and global debates 
despite these efforts. The argument permeating this paper states that while oil remains a security 
concern to both proponents and opponents to oil development in the Arctic, the extent to which 
this situation is seen as a threat or a security provider varies greatly. 
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1. Introduction: Doing oil 
In 2009, Norway celebrated 40 years of oil and gas extraction. A commemorative 
anthology comprised of fiction, myths and reminiscences written by historians, jour-
nalists, celebrities and novelists re-established a fairytale narrative that has followed 
the industry since its inception. The title itself, We found it, we found it,1 paraphrases 
one of Norwegian folklore’s most famous and popular characters, Askeladden – the 
story of a hapless young man who through his curiosity and tenacity gains fame and 
fortune by charming the princess and tricking the king into letting him marry her.2 
The allusion to this fairytale figure suggests that the story of the Norwegian oil and 
gas industry and to Norwegians by extension embodies the same qualities as those 
presented in the fairytale. That Norwegians conquer nature and the treasures under 
the seabed is seen as something typically Norwegian. Likewise, in a 2005 television 
documentary celebrating Norway’s hundred years of independence from Sweden, 
four decades of oil extraction (to that date) is presented as something emanating 
from specific Norwegian qualities:
“… (the ocean) has taught the Norwegian (Nordmannen) that no life exists without 
hardship, no happiness without suffering.”3 
Extend the Askeladden metaphor with perseverance and a sense of being a provin-
cial outpost in modern Europe, and the backdrop for the Norwegian fairytale is 
set. Finding black gold is the ultimate triumph. The celebratory texts of the 2009 
anniversary anthology was preluded with an introduction by then Prime Minister 
Jens Stoltenberg. He focused on employment and revenues generated from the oil 
industry and the specific global responsibility of Norway as a provider of energy to 
the world:
Through being a stable and predictable provider of oil and gas to international markets, 
we contribute to energy security both regionally and globally. (…) We cannot choose 
between energy or (the) climate, we must choose both. (…) The technological basis for 
the Norwegian petroleum industry gives us the opportunity to contribute to solving the 
challenges of a warming climate. The discharge of greenhouse gases from the [production 
at the] Norwegian shelf is amongst the lowest in the world. Technology developed at the 
Norwegian shelf contributes to a lower release of climate gases [from production, our 
insertion] than in other countries.4 
Three years later, Stoltenberg stated that he had no idea what Norway would do 
‘after oil’, as it would seemingly last another “…fifty to a hundred years…”, and 
that those who were talking about a time after oil were “… well paid to present 
rubbish…”.5 At the time, the Prime Minister promoted research and science as a 
way forward to enable enhanced extraction techniques. The outsider Askeladden 
had become King, and the King had no intention of risking his kingdom to mere 
speculation. The mythical past (finding oil) was thus coupled to a particular techno- 
scientific rationale of practicing extractivism. This narrative supported the rationale 
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of governing offshore hydrocarbon spaces as a source of future economic security 
and simultaneously as a means of mitigating human induced climate change (as 
Norwegian oil was depicted as ‘greener’ than the global average6). This rationale 
dominated discourses on the future of Norwegian oil during the first fifteen years of 
the 2000s. 
1.1 Polar Pioneering
Of the seven thousand oil platforms scattered across the world, one more than any 
other symbolizes the ups and downs of Arctic and Norwegian oil futures: the canary 
yellow exploration rig Polar Pioneer. The name is not coincidental; it was built in 
the early 1980s to deal with subarctic environments, extreme cold and high waves. 
Dubbed the “North-Norwegian Platform” in the 1980s because of its role in early 
exploration of the Barents Sea and its Tromsø-based ownership, it has been espe-
cially important for Equinor (Statoil until 2018)7, notably with the discovery of the 
Johan Castberg field in the Barents Sea in 2011.
But the Arctic Canary has been elsewhere as well. In May 2015, Polar Pioneer was 
surrounded by environmental activists in kayaks as it entered Puget Sound headed 
for Seattle. The Seattle City Council had voted against the entrance of the platform 
and civil resistance was strong. Shell, who had leased the rig, admitted that they were 
taken by surprise by the confrontation. Shortly after, Shell cancelled plans to drill 
in Alaska. Thus, it became world famous for the wrong reasons for Shell. For Arctic 
drilling, the Polar Pioneer came to symbolize failed exploration campaigns in Alaska, 
instead of the subordination of the northern seascape to human ingenuity and con-
trol over nature. More generally, it reflected the end of the expectation that the Arctic 
would become the new ‘Middle East’ in terms of abundant reserves, especially in the 
Barents Sea, where expectations have so to speak ‘vanished’.8 
The viability of potential oil fields in the Barents Sea plays into Equinor’s narra-
tive of the region as the ‘workable Arctic’. According to the company, in this space 
extraction solutions can be based on “… known technologies, and any remaining 
technology needs are within reach in the short to medium term”.9 Emphasizing 
this understanding of the Barents Sea as the ‘workable Arctic’, makes a distinction 
between the Barents and more challenging parts of the Arctic, like the coastal waters 
off Alaska, defined as the stretch Arctic “… (requiring) major innovation but could 
be achievable with focused investment in the medium to long term”.10  This division 
of the seascape into the ‘workable’, ‘stretched’ and - on a longer time scale – the 
‘extreme Arctic’ (in need of a long-term focus and investments in technology) feeds 
on and strengthens the political viability of a scenario depicting an Arctic oil boom. 
Moreover, the geopolitics of the Arctic as a fossil fuel energy landscape also include 
a worst-case scenario where an Arctic oil race would unleash a scramble for the 
Arctic. As Norway’s most important high north motivation was new energy resources, 
Norway positioned itself to take a leading role amongst the Arctic states in pushing 
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northward.11 The underlying narrative here is clear: get there first or miss the final 
opportunity to exploit large, new areas for drilling on the Norwegian shelf; in other 
words, a race to the bottom where arguments concerning Norway’s ability to secure 
so-called green oil to the world and natural gas to our European allies took center 
stage. 
Thus, in May 2017, following a government-led program mapping oil and gas 
prospects on the Norwegian continental shelf, the Norwegian Petroleum Director-
ate (NPD) doubled their assessment of potential petroleum revenues in the Barents 
Sea.12 This new assessment included the Barents Sea North. This was a bold move, 
as this seascape partly includes off-limit areas north of the marginal ice zone (the 
so-called “ice edge”), an area identified in a plethora of research articles and reports 
as highly vulnerable and valuable for the ecosystems of the Arctic.13 After mapping 
the Barents North through seismic surveys and shallow explorations, the NPD esti-
mated that the Barents Sea could hold 65 percent of the undiscovered oil and gas 
reserves in Norway, in effect redefining its importance and including it in the viable 
future of ‘the oil’ in Norway. 
Even though assessments vary, there is general consensus that global investments 
in oil exploration have fallen sharply since the oil price fall in 2014.14 Canada and 
(Illustration 1. The Polar Pioneer, symbolically yellow as a Canary bird – both a materialization 
of the idea of a petroleum-driven perception of Arctic futures and a symbol of the heightened 
risk associated with large-scale investment in extractive projects in the region. (Photo: Per Ivar 
Somby, 2011. Used with permission).
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the US15 have put a moratorium on Arctic drilling due to a mix of environmental 
concerns and an assessment of risks tied to production costs. Russia’s activities have 
been modest, and new Arctic offshore developments have been put on hold until at 
least 2020 based on economic reasoning. There is also a standstill in initial explo-
ration in Iceland and Greenland due to plummeting oil prices and heightened risks 
associated with investing in ‘immature’ regions. At present, the Arctic seems to be in 
an unfavorable position vis-a-vis potential new oil and gas prospects in other parts 
of the world, including unconventional fossil fuels in the US, which are making a 
comeback. This leaves Norway, represented by the Norwegian Petroleum Director-
ate and state-controlled Equinor, as the de facto petroleum polar pioneer. Not only 
does Norway see Arctic reserves as both lucrative and desirable, it has acted upon 
this belief. Still, after drilling around 170 exploration wells, only one gas field (Snow 
White) and one oil field (Goliat) have been developed, and seven years after the 
prospect Johan Castberg was discovered by Polar Pioneer, Equinor has still not finally 
decided how it will invest in its development. In the meantime, the government has 
been in the process of licensing about 150 new exploration blocks since 2015. As the 
state covers 78 per cent of its costs through the taxation system, one could say the 
effort – and risk – surely is as economical as it is political for the government and 
thus for the Norwegian population. It remains to be seen whether these prospects 
will meet the expectations of oil and gas actors and play a key role in maintaining the 
long-term profitability of the industry – or if they will end up in a category defined 
by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate as ´will never be drilled´. Scrapping plans 
to develop these Arctic fields would mean a more sudden beginning of the inevitable 
end of the Norwegian petroleum era than anticipated just a few years ago. 
As these introductory stories exemplify, the linking of a mythical Norwegianness 
to the extraction of oil permeates discourses on its past, present and future. Coupled 
with a techno-scientific rationality, this narrows the space for alternatives, and thus 
defines the parameters within which the political space for ‘the oil’ is negotiated in 
Norway. We therefore, after a presentation of the theoretical framework for our anal-
ysis in section 2, turn our attention in section 3 to another environmentally sensitive 
region (as defined in the Management Plan for the Barents and Lofoten Seas) – the 
rich fishing grounds surrounding the Lofoten islands in the southern parts of the 
Norwegian Arctic. What kind of narratives and practices are unravelling there, and 
how do these include considerations of potential future trajectories beyond polar 
pioneering? 
2. The past, present, and future of oil as a security concern
Narratives about the Norwegian oil ontology is, we claim, a matter of ensuring a 
sense of ontological security in the national population. We have found that the way 
the concept ontological security has developed, from a focus on the state as the 
main security provider to a broader understanding of what – and who – provides 
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security for populations, has opened for pertinent ways of discussing the relationship 
between institutions, epistemic communities and local stakeholders for this case, not 
least with respect to the ways in which a conformist understanding of ontological 
security blurs power relations and inclusion/exclusion processes concerning who is 
secured by which measures.16 Starting with a definition of ontological security pro-
posed by Anthony Giddens as “…the confidence that most human beings have in 
the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of their social and material 
environments of action”,17 we argue that a broadened focus on acts and actors influ-
encing the ontological security ramifications of the potential future of Norwegian 
Arctic petroleum enables us to analyze how specific narratives evoke a connection 
between identity (‘who we are’) and extractive strategies (‘what we do’), and how 
these narratives evoke a sense of inevitability with respect to a petroleum driven 
future, supported by technological development and a scientifically-based mastery 
of nature. Just as Veland and Lynch find that narratives about nature constructed by 
(and from) science are foundational for the sake of securing continuity in one’s sur-
roundings (2016),18 we find that stories constructing a sense of the naturalization of 
competence relevant for petroleum extraction embedded in the ‘Norwegian’ identity 
matter when decisions are made concerning how the nation state can best provide 
security for the Norwegian population. As they argue, “Myths fill gaps in under-
standing, implicitly staging desired outcomes and alternatives”.19 
There is, in other words, a combination of techno-scientific bravado and a sense 
of a naturalized way of being Norwegian that sustains the Norwegian petroleum fairy-
tale narrative. However, the matter of sustaining (or securing) a population based 
on an extension of the realm of oil and gas – both in time and space – suffers from 
a lack of processual understanding of sustainability – and thus of long-term security 
needs. Instead of the dominant threshold- and endpoint-based assessments of risk 
and potential benefits from a continued ‘extractivist’ ideology, studies have shown 
that a circular modalities and multiple sustainabilities approach is needed. In order 
to face the multiple challenges ahead,20 not least those pertaining to the future need 
for energy,21 loss of biodiversity,22 dependence on non-renewable minerals23 and 
access to means of food production for future generations, we draw on Rossdale’s 
assessment of the ontological security framework.24 This reflects how securing the 
population through the oil ontology may in fact increase a sense of future ontological 
insecurity. The reason to opt for a continued reliance on oil and gas is at least partly 
based on the conundrum that radical change is more often seen as a threat than 
something desirable – even though it is meant to secure against well-documented 
and defined threats such as the effects of global climate warming.25 
Because adding to the list of uncertainties, indeed insecurities, is of course climate 
change. As its consequences surface – not only direct impacts to the well-being of 
populations, but also its effects on policies, finance, technology and ontologies – new 
paradigms arise. Trajectories that reference past experiences without acknowledg-
ing the unpredictabilities that signify rapid, non-linear and abrupt change increase 
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insecurity, and unfortunately for Norway, expose the vulnerabilities of being an oil- 
dependent society. Previously, risk assessments have primarily focused on techno-
logical risks concerning search and extraction; environmental risks primarily tied to 
the potential for local or regional negative effects; and financial risks mainly based on 
assessments of oil prices being set primarily by upstream accessibility, not a potential 
fall in demand. Future risk assessments of further exploration and extraction should 
include new variables such as liability for future loss of lives and property due to cli-
matic changes driven by the burning of fossil fuels, the potential financial risks tied to 
a tax regime in which the Norwegian state de facto invests in the potential for future 
revenues from risky and expensive petroleum extraction sites, and the risk of path 
dependency and ‘lock-in’. As Veland and Lynch have pointed out, increasing onto-
logical insecurity may very well lead to “… insistence on having the ‘right’ knowledge 
and connections, insistence on a particular narrative, while violently marginalizing 
others”,26 a situation which they call the “… trap of ontological insecurity”.27 This in 
turn might lead to fundamentalism, or what we here more modestly call path depen-
dency and technological lock-in. In practice, this might entail processes that lead to 
stranded assets and carbon lock-ins through infrastructure developments. In short, 
mundane questions concerning how to make sure future investments have a sound 
long-term risk profile is pivotal when making long-term energy investments.28 For the 
communities taking the risk, adaptive capacities and resilience need to be sufficiently 
secured29 so that future capabilities for transformation are put in place.30 These con-
siderations should, we argue, open up political space for disruptive ontologies, new 
ways of understanding the interdependency between surroundings and meaningful 
realities post-petroleum.31 The post-petroleum analysis outlined in this paper there-
fore presents and promotes discussions on how perceptions about the future include 
multiple understandings of viability, of well-being, and of the potential of multiple 
future trajectories. This contrasts with hegemonic narratives that claim rationality 
when depicting one possible future as the only plausible alternative. Supporters of a 
future dominated by new extractivism in the LoVeSe and Barents seas are still ‘talking 
security’. The focus is still on a future enmeshed in oil in ways that presupposes the 
survival of the oil ontology well beyond the transformative stages into post-carbon 
futures. Choosing oil today equips you for the future, the argument goes:
If you choose petroleum, you choose a field that will be important for years to come. 
We know that 60 percent of the world’s need for energy will be covered by oil and gas in 
2040. Choosing petroleum is therefore to choose (i.e. do the right thing for) the future. 
I wish the media would communicate the long message, namely that petroleum is a part 
of the future, as is renewables as well. I will therefore advise young people to choose 
petroleum.32 
But with volatile oil prices, national debates have shifted. Compared to narratives 
about future pathways presented only a few years back, there is a different future 
envisioned ahead. Trajectories are discussed with a greater sense of multiplicity, 
urgency and sincerity pertaining to the need for transformation (although these 
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narratives are far from uncontested). In order to understand the manifestation of 
alternative trajectories as something new, it is important not to overlook the way 
local debates – not least in LoVeSe - have included alternative visions of future 
pathways. These open for a variety of potential futures post-petroleum that has already 
materialized over the past few years. This means that the potential of being included 
in the era defined by the oil ontology is becoming less relevant. What we find instead 
is a focus on a basis for alternative pathways to a future post-petroleum that lies – par-
adoxically, perhaps – in the past. We have previously analyzed how two resources – 
petroleum and fish – are mutually exclusive in debates about oil drilling and the 
future in the Lofoten region.33 They represent, put bluntly, two different worldviews 
upon which an ontologically secure future can be built. This reflects the idea that 
not only are there two oppositional alternative futures that lay ahead; one with petro-
leum and the other without, but also that there are two different approaches to the 
long-term post-petroleum security of the region, one local and one national, that cut 
across the pro/con-petroleum divide. In this hierarchy of security concerns, ‘the oil’ 
(as people in Lofoten call it) is a potentially calculable reserve, providing the state 
and its population with future wealth as a basis for (ontological) security. Even so, 
whilst these national mainstream perspectives reflect anxieties about whether these 
resources can be left in the ground if the welfare state is to be maintained, discus-
sions in Lofoten also reflect considerations concerning when they can or should be 
extracted, focusing on the period of extraction as a passing phase that should not 
threaten the potential for a viable future – economically, ecologically, and physically – 
and thus ontologically. 
3. Lofoten with or beyond oil
Lofoten – or more precisely the joint Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja regions (abbr. 
LoVeSe) - plays a key role when path-dependency and the future of hydrocarbons 
in Norway are discussed.34 For protagonists, access to the sea outside these regions 
for petroleum development is a vital part of the development of the ‘workable Arc-
tic’ discussed above; a ‘step by step’ operational push northwards in which Equinor 
sees the oil and gas in LoVeSe as having a key strategic role for developments in the 
southernmost areas of the Barents Sea. Both LoVeSe and southern parts of the Bar-
ents Sea are believed to be technologically manageable. The threshold for access to 
these areas is thus thought to be created, not by ‘nature’ or a lack of human ingenuity 
a la Askeladden, but by politics. 
This last description of LoVeSe is indicative of the need for the petroleum indus-
try not to give up on their defining right to explore wherever they feel it is viable eco-
nomically. This is backed by an NPD 2011 assessment that it contains 1.5 billion 
barrels of oil, which equals eight days of global oil consumption. This is one of the 
ways in which Lofoten is ‘normalized’ as a frontier carbon space in the global politi-
cal economy, as a space-making process for viable Norwegian oil futures. 
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It is pertinent to ask what kind of imaginaries are challenging this naturalization 
of a trajectory based on what we refer to here as the oil ontology,35 and what resili- 
ent and alternative visions and practices evoking disruptive ontologies are arising 
that might replace the one where the area is ‘up for grabs’. Importantly, though, 
we also find it necessary to analyze how ‘the ultimate, empty frontier’ of LoVeSe 
and Equinor/Statoil’s categorization of the southern parts of the Barents Sea as the 
‘workable Arctic’ both play into narratives evoking policies of path dependency and 
a future in the north based on a hydrocarbon fueled economy. 
An important premise for these narratives is found in the construction of spe-
cific parameters for the inclusion and exclusion of the knowledge deemed relevant 
for securing a petroleum-driven future.36 The act of extraction concerning both the 
LoVeSe frontier and the ‘workable Arctic’ category as defined by Equinor/Statoil is 
clearly an indication that as long as a techno-scientific assessment of possibilities 
are left to solve the problem of access to the petroleum riches, the areas are within 
reach. As claimed in Equinor/Statoil’s own description of their Arctic strategies to 
peers in the online publication World Expro in 2017, it is a “mission possible” if left in 
the capable hands of engineers, geologists and petroleum analysts.37 The extractive 
industries hold on the political debate has dwindled though, as public awareness 
concerning the direct interlinkages between domestic petroleum development, 
future economic and ontological security and climate change has grown, a process 
(Illustration 2. The constructed void in the map over sea areas outside LoVeSe from an oil  
ontology perspective (Ill 1), and the complexity of fishery and oil interaction (Ill 2)  
(Graphics: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (left) and Friends of the Earth Norway (right)). 
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clearly indicating that a platform for alternative visions of the future has begun to 
take hold even in national Norwegian politics. 
Political debate in Lofoten has gone from a “conditional no” in the early 2000’s 
pending considerations over fisheries, via a “conditional yes” in terms of statements 
about potential ripple effects around 2010,38 to an “unconditional no” in the pres-
ent. In recent years, ‘the oil’ has largely been absent in local and regional debates 
about strategic economic development, as there are other more pressing issues in 
terms of economic opportunities. The oil ontology seems distant politically and geo-
graphically, reflecting the center-periphery axis of political power in terms of deter-
mining a viable future for northern communities. As a Lofoten merchant explained 
in July 2017 when the oil ontology came up in discussions over the counter in his 
store: “Lofoten is characterized by optimism; good times in the fisheries rubs off on 
other industries and the general atmosphere. In other words,” he explained, “there 
is no room for oil here, not in terms of areas at sea, or in terms of development over 
the next few years”. He repeated a sentiment often heard in the local debate: “… we 
should leave it to the next generations to decide”. Exhibiting strong feelings about 
this issue, he said that even though he had never engaged in politics or conflicts, he 
would turn to civil disobedience and physically put himself in front of exploration 
platforms in the water if ‘the oil’ came to Lofoten “… in the name of my (unborn) 
grandchildren”.39 The political leverage of the fisheries has changed following eco-
nomic growth in recent years, which is also reflected when key political figures come 
to Lofoten to promote oil futures. “Zero emissions with oil development,” prom-
ised Prime Minister Erna Solberg when she visited Lofoten to promote oil develop-
ment in the summer of 2018. She argued that “… past experience with co-existence 
between the industry and the fisheries indicates that it will work out”.40 The CEO 
of the local fish processing company Insula, Sigvald Rist, responded by stating that 
“… the oil industry will be very damaging for us”, referring not only to the potential 
for an oil spill (although the risk is minor), but also to the effects of seismic shooting 
that takes place in the fishing areas for weeks at a time, in effect stopping deliverance 
of fresh fish. He went on to reflect back to the summers of 2007 to 2009 when the 
Petroleum Directorate conducted seismic shooting in the LoVeSe regions: 
“… the fishermen were paid to stay onshore. It is OK that the fishermen were paid, but 
industry on land did not get anything. We would rather make money on goods we sell.”41
It is an oft-repeated paradox that whilst national political figures keep bringing 
up the matter of opening Lofoten for oil exploration and development again and 
again, the region has seen a veritable upsurge in innovation and entrepreneurship – 
primarily based on one old and one new industry – fisheries and tourism. But there 
are also processes resembling those found in so-called creative cities or neighbor-
hoods studied by urbanists (and mostly economists)42 – a string of new, small-scale 
businesses of numerous kinds, providing jobs for an increasing number of people 
choosing to live there because of the lifestyle the region enables them to pursue. In 
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short, whilst the debate over oil rages, ontological security is in the process of being 
created in the region bottom-up. For northerners, the oil and gas-driven develop-
ment meant to foster ontological security is seen as irrelevant, perhaps even a dis-
ruption, a source of insecurity. In many ways, Northern Norway’s local industries 
have experienced the opposite effects of the ‘oil price shock’ that has reverberated 
across the south. Exporting industries and tourism, have been given a boost as the 
Norwegian krone has weakened, in sync with the price of oil. This strengthens what 
we identify as a hierarchy of security concerns in Lofoten, where fisheries come first, 
and other existing primary industries related to food production come second along 
with a booming tourism industry. The potential extraction of oil and gas and with 
that the introduction of a new industry is considered of lesser importance, or even 
unimportant at the time of writing, in discussions of potential futures in Lofoten, 
a notion that is also reflected in a poll from the summer of 2017 where more than 
seven out of ten northerners did not want to open for oil development.43
As life goes on in Lofoten, without oil, it pivots around the fisheries and the ocean, 
culturally and socio-economically rooted in inherited practices with a mix of tra-
ditional and new knowledge and technologies, characterized by a particular sense 
of nature, of being-in-the-world, to paraphrase Tim Ingold.44 The question of oil in 
Lofoten stirs up as much insecurity over whether the region will be able to secure a 
meaningful future post-petroleum as it stirs up notions of prosperity and income, short 
term. In many ways then, what gets recognized as an asset in these seascapes reflects 
contrasting practices related to a long history of harvesting from nature, state oil 
ontology strategies and oil company exploration interests. Our attentiveness to an oil 
fueled future thus recognizes that it is based on an ontology of extraction that admit-
tedly has provided economic security for the Norwegian state and its population in 
the past and the present. However, it will potentially trap Norwegian society in a 
developmental trajectory where potential alternatives for the future are excluded. 
As Canavan has noted, “… in the era of oil ontology, oil becomes synonymous with 
progress, even with the future itself”45 – the future imagined without an ontological 
shift risks becoming path dependent, unable to meet the challenges ahead. We there-
fore argue for a focus not only on disruptive technologies, but even more impor-
tantly on fostering disruptive ontologies, as the imagining of potential post-petroleum 
futures begins with paving multiple paths, multiple possible trajectories. 
Another disruptive ontology apart from that based upon more or less traditional 
ways of harvesting from nature has manifested itself in the recent Lofoten Declara-
tion.46 A number of global NGOs under the umbrella of labor, development, climate 
and environmental justice came together for a strategy meeting in Lofoten in August 
2017 and called for a long-term moratorium on the Lofoten islands, where activists 
and scientists concerned with local, national and global environmental and climate 
threats challenged Norway to leave the oil in the ground to comply with the 2°C 
target from the Paris Declaration of 2015. A major motivation for the movement to 
choose LoVeSe as a key moratorium site was the potential of LoVeSe being the ‘first 
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win’ in an ongoing struggle to leave oil in the ground and bringing it into the con-
versation at the Bonn Climate Summit in November 2017 (COP23). As observed by 
one of the authors who was present in Bonn, the signing of the Lofoten Declaration 
became one of the key NGO-driven events at the summit, as global NGO figures 
from both the global south and north gathered at the event to sign the declaration. 
It adheres to the discourse presented in a paper on the geographical distribution of 
unburnable fossil fuels by McGlade and Ekins which states that Arctic oil should 
be off limits based on the perspective that “… globally, a third of oil reserves, half 
of gas reserves and over 80 per cent of current coal reserves should remain unused 
from 2010 to 2050 in order to meet the target of 2°C.”47 The Lofoten Declaration 
states that inequalities within and between fossil fuel producing countries should 
lead to rich oil producing states like Norway leaving oil in the ground. Initiatives 
like this show that the bottom-up processes we previously have described in Lofoten 
(where local responses to top-down initiatives permeate politics48) has also reached 
the international scene, exemplified in alternative strategies for future climate policy 
design. Rather than responding to market-driven pressures associated with demand-
side initiatives (i.e. consumption), supply-constraint initiatives to limit production, 
as reflected in the Lofoten Declaration, can offer more direct and intentional options 
to current and future fossil fuel producers. As such, supply-constraints offer a geo-
political economic ‘space’ of purposeful political intervention that can help manage 
the economic (and political) fallouts of a transition away from fossil fuels.49 Thus we 
posit that the post-petroleum argument, in which we describe ways in which alter-
native futures envisioned from below may have transformative power, is strengthened 
by observations of developments after the 2014 oil price crash described here, with 
pressures to take on global responsibilities. 
4. Lofoten, the problem of oil – and oil’s big problem
”… oil is (…) ontology, the structuring ‘Real’ of our contemporary sociopolitical 
imaginary”50 
”Oil as hyperobject”, Gerry Canavan writes in the anthology Oil Culture, ”delimits 
our ability to both understand our historical past and imagine our possible futures, 
becoming the secret subtext of any number of futurological imaginings.”51 In the 
foreword to the same anthology Allan Stoekl describes oil as “… the ultimate cultural- 
natural artefact”.52 Barrett and Worden identify oil as the hub in a 
… vast network or ”assemblage” of interlinked technological, commercial, financial, and 
political initiatives. (…) We are the slaves of our energy – slaves in a surprising revision of 
the Hegelian master-slave dialectic. We work to further oil’s consumption, imagining ever 
more wasteful ”uses” for it – from lavish oil-heated homes to gas-guzzling Hummers. 
We cannot help to realize that in some sense we are oil: all those grain-fed cattle we eat, 
themselves fed with cereals grown with fossil-fuel – derived fertilizers and protected 
by oil-based pesticides; all the water purified and pumped with the use of fossil fuels; 
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all the wars powered and won with fossil fuels – not least all the wars for control of oil 
resources. And we are the disappearance of oil. We are human, social, cultural – that is, 
we are not formed by a god, we form, make, ourselves – but we are also what we have 
done with oil. And oil is natural in the sense that it is present, then absent: it is finite, and 
that ultimate finitude is well beyond our control.53
No less. The idea that we can solve how to live without oil through seeing oil as 
part of the solution to the challenges represented by the warming of the planet may 
seem illogical, but evidently it is imaginable, not least through abstractive practices 
delineating the basis for policy making in a transformation era to the parameters of 
an oil ontology54; a world where nothing happens, nothing develops, without oil. What 
a focus on a solution to the utilization of fossil fuels using fossil fuels reveals, then, 
is a matter of endpoint vs process; as endpoints close to – for instance 2040 or even 
2100 – are meant to put a focus on the need for action, the result is often that the 
consumption of fossil fuels is provided at that exact endpoint a space in which to 
maneuver; a room for utilization within predefined parameters of a techno-scientific 
assessment of acceptable risk.55 Therefore, the argument is that the only possible 
future (at specified endpoints, like 2040) is one where oil still occupies a significant 
space, as - again – “… the subtext of any futurological imaginings”, as quoted from 
Canavan above. 
Another factor hampering the imagining of alternative futures – except, obviously, 
the highly unpleasant prospect of the public having to deviate from a petroleum-driven 
economy, which explains the electoral gridlock on making climate change an issue 
that truly matters when ballots are cast – is the way in which a focus on disruptive 
technologies without attending to the need for ontological reorientation or disruptive 
ontologies (see above) dominates strategic discussions on how to ensure that Norwe-
gian society is provided with the necessary transitional capabilities. The path on which 
most walk is one where the transition of technological know-how from the petroleum 
industry to new, emerging, greener technologies is a core strategy, a strategy that can 
only work, it is argued, if the petroleum industry is provided with new opportunities 
– and challenges – where technological innovation is needed. Consider for instance 
the Barents Sea or the vulnerable LoVeSe areas. It is argued that technologies to be 
invented in the future will secure revenues from expected oil and gas fields in these 
regions, and will also be the basis for the technology that will ensure a transition to 
a low-carbon – and then (sometime in the undefined future), a no-carbon future. 
Therefore, the logic goes, we need big oil – and the capabilities, tenacity and ingenuity of 
the technologists that support it – to get to post-petroleum society. 
A final point to be made which influences the current debate on alternative futures 
is that oil is not only the problem – it is in deep trouble itself, de facto losing its value 
as a long-term reserve for producers. Indeed, the industry and its protagonist’s hege-
monic position in defining the parameters for discussing the future is, as mentioned, 
waning. Even though oil prices have risen since the 2014 crash, and expenses in 
the industry have driven down the break-even point, the fact that American shale 
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oil has introduced an endemic imbalance in the developed checks-and-balances sys-
tem of international oil trade has made debaters in Norway acutely aware of the 
heightened risk profile of future petroleum investments in the north, and ‘after-oil’ 
scenarios are being discussed with greater urgency today than just a couple of years 
back – with a particular focus on the Lofoten area as a first site for leaving oil in the 
ground. As the size of the market for oil is likely to decrease, again due to competing 
energy sources and electrification of the transport sector, the most technologically 
challenging and economically pricy projects will lose in the end. This is also a reason 
why the Norwegian petroleum industry wants a carbon tax; assuming that there will 
be a need for a certain amount of petroleum in the future, the matter of who will 
produce and sell it is imperative for the future prospects of the industry, both glob-
ally and in Norway. A global carbon tax would surely be beneficial for Norwegian oil 
and gas, as a national tax was implemented 25 years ago and competition with others 
would greatly improve if other actors also had to pay for polluting while producing. 
5. Summary Remarks
Challenging the oil ontology – the world view – upon which arguments for the con-
tinued expansion of oil and gas extraction northwards, into unchartered waters both 
geographically and metaphorically (as technological risks are combined with new 
levels of financial, political and scientific insecurities) are in our opinion of utmost 
importance, if we are to ensure a pluralistic approach to the multifaceted challenges 
of the future. Surely, increased awareness of the heightened risks connected to the 
expansion of oil and gas development northwards has begun to manifest in political 
discourses and in more forceful counter-argumentation to the oil fairytale narrative. 
During fieldwork only a few years back, we would meet national oil executives on 
tour in northern Norway seeking local support for the expansion northwards who 
blatantly disregarded opposition as ‘sentimentalism’, based on ‘emotions, not facts’. 
Today, most national petroleum executives take the opposition far more seriously 
and have co-opted discourses of climate change and concern for local and regional 
environmental risks. They also acknowledge the needs of other industries. Strategi-
cally though, they have seemingly turned away from the argument that petroleum 
development is primarily a source for development in the northernmost regions, and 
instead focus – as we have outlined – on the need for northward expansion for the 
sake of the future security of the Norwegian population. 
Now 50 years after first finding it, Norwegians are forever tied to oil. Or so the story 
goes. But the past, in fact, reflects the passing quality of oil and its connection to a 
sense of collective, ontological security; just as it has delivered unprecedented wealth 
to the people of the Norwegian regions of Rogaland, Hordaland and Sogn og Fjor-
dane – and, obviously, to the financial sector in Oslo - it will eventually wither away, 
thereby presenting us with a situation of potential ontological insecurity, not least as an 
imagined community secured by oil no longer feels home to all Norwegians.56 As we 
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have experienced recently, with the sudden and unprecedented plummeting of petro-
leum prices – the Norwegian petroleum industry is vulnerable to changes in the volatile 
international energy market, and there is a concern that we are in danger of implement-
ing strategies where authoritarian notions of what secures the immediate and long-
term future dominate. Contrary to narratives promoting the continuation of petroleum 
extraction northwards as a means of securing the future, oil will not last forever, and 
the energy industry will eventually change beyond adaptation, away from fossils. But for 
now, narratives that insist that oil will provide ontological security into the future have 
adopted the climate change political discourse, and manipulated emission models for 
hydrocarbon within a 2°C scenario for 2040 to show that their products can be a part 
of the future, and that oil and gas are part of the solution to the climate challenge.57 
However – trying to show that the source of the problem is part of a permanent solution 
is more difficult. Thus, the connection between petroleum and ontological security is 
surely a passing one for the Norwegian population – and one which eventually will turn 
on the industry as well, as their connections to “Norwegianness” no longer will hold 
merit as their presence in Norwegian politics, economy, and broader society shrinks. 
The worry, of course, is that with the current focus on being a part of the solution, a 
continued oil-driven economy and technological development will lead us too far down 
a path where a fossil epistemic community still dominates. 
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